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This paper was commissioned by the Mobilization Concepts
Development Center (MCDC), an arm of the National Defense
University's Institute for National Strategic Studies. MCDC is
chartered to provide analytical and research support on national
resource issues to the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary
of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
MCDC was asked by the bipartisan Commission on Integrated
Long-Term Strategy (established in 1987) to study global
demographic trends to the year 2010 and to assess the
implications of these trends for U.S. national security. The
demographic study, one of several efforts in behalf of the
Commission, set out to "identify those emerging population
developments that (a) pose an increased or diminished threat to
U.S. or allied interests, (b) offer increased or diminished
potential for violent conflict, or (c) alter regional and/or
global distributions of power."
A "Global Demographic Trends" workshop was held on May 6-7,
1987 at Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C., the home of the
National Defense University. Ten working groups, representing
the ten countries or regions defined for the study, convened
during the first day of the workshop. An eleventh working group
examined methodological or epistemolog ical issues. The following
persons participated as members of the working group on the
United States and Canada: H. Wallace Sinaiko, Smithsonian
Institution (and working group chairman); Martin Binkin,
Brookings Institution; Robert L. Goldich, Congressional Research
Service; Lawrence Long, Bureau of the Census; Col. Franklin C.
Pinch, Canadian Forces; David R. Segal, University of Maryland;
Signe I. Wetrogan, Bureau of the Census; and Mark J. Eitelberg,
Naval Postgraduate School. Several themes in the paper
benefitted from discussions held at this working group session.
This paper was completed in August 1987.
The views and interpretations expressed here are those of
the author and should not be ascribed to any Government
department or agency.
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AMERICAN DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS AND NATIONAL SECURITY:
ISSUES FOR THE 21st CENTURY
n I know of no way of judging the future but by the
past." Patrick Henry, 1775
"You can never plan the future by the past."
Edmund Burke, 1791
Predicting the future is a deadly art. Praise be to the
person who can say "I told you so," the one who can delight in
the event of a forecast come true. For every such person there
must be a few million more who lament in silence, "Where did I go
wrong?"
Predictions, projections, speculations, or educated guesses
about the days, months, or years ahead are an essential part of
the planning process. They provide a way of preparing for the
likely or less likely future. Typically, the attempt to see
ahead is based on experiences of the past, the only observation
post available. In this way we are often led to assume that
forces of the past will continue in similar fashion throughout
the future. And here lies the great weakness of our ways:
unexpected occurrences in science, politics, economics, and
social relat ions--maybe but a single event--are capable of
nullifying any set of prophetic assumptions, and usually do.
This paper focuses on American demographic trends and
speculates about the possible effects of these trends on national
security over the next qu ar t er -c en tu r y . Fortunately, a
generation or so of demographic trends are somewhat easier to
forecast than trends in other areas, such as the 1996 elections,
next year's Dow Jones, or tomorrow's barometric pressure. (More
than two-thirds of the U.S. population in 2010, according to some
projections, have already been born. ) Estimating the effects of
1Bureau of the Census, Projections of the Population of the
United States, by Age. Sex, and Racer 1963-2080 , Series P-25,
No. 952 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1984), p.
25.
these trends on national security is more problematical, since it
requires considerable conjecture about future events in
nondemographic areas.
This is one way of acknowledging, especially to readers of
the coming time, that the present attempt to see ahead contains
an appropriate share of mistaken assumptions. As Old Lodge Skins
observed in the movie Little Big Man (1970), after failing to
foretell the precise moment of his death, "sometimes the magic
works, sometimes it doesn't." Perhaps the one sure prediction
that anyone can make is that the unforeseen will always remain an
unforeseen certainty.
Selected Demographic Trends
Several demographic trends are expected to influence the
condition of national security over the next twenty-five years.
These trends and related events are summarized below. A
discussion of possible implications for national security
follows.
o The United States population is projected to grow by
approximately 40 million, reaching about 283 million in the
year 2010. A population decline is expected to begin seven
years later.
o Although the population is now increasing, the United
States has maintained a fertility rate for the past 15 years
that is below the replacement level of 2.1 births (average)
per woman. This has been characterized as a "birth dearth"
and is common among the Western Alliance nations."
2 Ibid., pp. 77-78; and Bureau of the Census, Population
Profile of the United States: 1984-85 , Series P-23, No. 150
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1987), p. 6.
-See Ben J. Wattenberg, The Birth Dearth (New York: Pharos
Books, 1987). It should be noted that the annual number of
births is increasing as a result of the "echo effect" of the
"baby boom." Since there are more women of childbearing age now,
births have been rising—even though these women, on the average,
have been bearing fewer children than did their predecessors.
o The population 18 to 24 years peaked in 1981 at 30.5
million--a total that may not be surpassed for at least the
next 100 years. This "military-age" group will decline by
around 7 million through 1996 and then gradually increase
again to peak at around 27.7 million in 2010 (comparable to
the population level in 1987).
o From 1972 through 1984, the population of 19-year-clds
exceeded 4 million each year, peaking at 4.5 million in
1980. For most of the 1990s, the 19-year-old cohort will
number fewer than 3.4 million, about three-quarters the size
of the 1980 level. In the year 2010, it is projected that
there will be 3.9 million persons at this age, historically
the median age of military recruits."
o The U.S. population is aging: the median age nationwide
was 31.5 years in 1985; in 2010, the median age is expected
to be more than 5 years older, as the youngest members cf
the "baby boom" generation (born between 1946 and 1964)
celebrate their 46th birthday. In 1985, there were 28.6
million Americans age 65 or older, representing just under
12 percent of the population. In 2010, the number of
persons in this age group will be about 39.2 million,
constituting close to 14 percent of the total population
—
with those 80 or older numbering almost 8 million more than
in 1985. 6
o Immigration may account for approximately one-fifth or
more of U.S. population growth in future years. In 1980, it
is estimated that 33 percent of the nation's growth was
attributable to immigration. There is still much
uncertainty about the future flow of immigrants, including
both legal and undocumented aliens.
o In 1985, persons of Spanish origin or descent represented
about 7 percent of the population. Middle series
projections indicate that this may increase to 11 percent by
2010, with higher proportions in younger age groups (for
instance, 13 percent of all 19-year-olds) . The lowest
Bureau of the Census projection for 2010 is 10 percent; and
Bureau of the Census, Population Profile , pp. 6-7.
Bureau of the Census, Projections of the Population , pp.
39-78. The modal age of new military recruits is currently 18
years
.
6 Ibid., pp. 43-44, 77-78. By the year 2030, the 65-and-
older group will total about 65 million--one of every five people
in the total population.
•7




the highest projection is around 14 percent. Under varying
assumptions, Hispanic persons could account for between 20
and 54 percent of U.S. population growth over the next 25
years
.
o By the year 2010, white non-Hispanic persons will
represent between 68 and 73 percent of the U.S. population,
compared with 78 percent in 1985, as the. jpropor t ion of
blacks, Hispanics, and Asians increases. The fastest
growing minority group--As ian-Amer icans-- is expected to
increase from around 1.6 percent of the population to just
over 3 percent by 2010. (In that year, California alone
will have as many Asian-Americans as there were in the
entire U.S. during 1985.)
o The population of children within elementary school ages
is expected to reach about 34 million by the turn of the
century, an increase from 30 million in the early 1980s.
This increase comes after a decline in elementary school
enrollments that began in 1970 and continued for more than a
decade. 12
o There has been a rapid increase in the number of single
parent families over the past several years--last tallied at
12.3 million in 1985, or about 1 out of every 5 families
nationwide. It is estimated that 14.6 million children
under 18 years of age--23.4 percent of the total— are now
living with one parent.
gBureau of the Census, Projections of the Hispanic Population:
1983-2080 . Series P-25, No. 995 (Washington, DC: Government
Printing Office, 1986), pp. 19-21.
Q
Ibid., p. 19; and Thomas Exter, "How Many Hispanics?,"
American Demographics , May 1987, p. 38.
Bureau of the Census, Hispanic Population , p. 20.
Leon F. Bouvier and Anthony J. Agresta, "The Fastest
Growing Minority," American Demographics , May 1985, pp. 31-46.
Bureau of the Census, Population Profile , p. 26; and
Bureau of the Census, Projections of the Population .
1 o
Bureau of the Census, Population Profile , p. 20.
Ibid., p. 23. As noted here, there were 7 million fewer
children below the age of 18 in 1985 than in 1970. However, in
the same 15-year period, the number of children living with one
parent increased by 6 million, and the number living with both
parents declined by 13 million.
o In 1985, studies showed that 71 percent of women 18 to 44
years old were in the labor force. About 48 percent of new
mothers (with a child 12 months or younger) were working,
compared with a rate of 31 percent for new mothers in
1971. 15 By 1990, it is estimated that 65 percent of all new
job applicants will be women.
o Educational attainment levels have been increasing among
persons 25 years and oyer, and proportionately more for
blacks than for whites. At the same time, there has been
a remarkable decline in scores on widely-used tests of
aptitude and scholastic achievement— including a drop in
scores on the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) that began in
1963 and apparently leveled off in the 1980s. 18 Other
researchers report massive IQ gains, ranging from 5 to 25
points, that have occurred over a single generation in 14
nations (including the United States).
o In 1986, it was estimated that at least 12 percent of the
population (28 million or more people) were alcoholics.
Just under one-third of the nation's households (40 percent
in the West) reported having someone at home with a drinking
problem. The population between 18 and 20 years had the
highest incidence of any age group in the nation: 44
percent claimed to be excessive drinkers.
15 Ibid., p. 9.
1
6
Government statistics cited in Anthony M. Casale, Track ing
Tomorrow's Trends (Kansas City: Andrews, McMeel, and Parker,
1986), p. 56. Two-thirds of the labor force growth will be among
women and one-fourth will be among blacks and other minorities,
as observed in Department of the Army, I Am the American Soldier ,
USASSC-FC21-451 (Fort Benjamin Harrison, IN: Soldier Support
Center, 31 October 1986), p. 6-4.
17Bureau of the Census, Population Profile , p. 28.
"I o
Brian K. Waters, The Test Score Decline: A Review and
Annotated Bibliography . Technical Memorandum 81-2 (Washington,
DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, August 1981); and Dianne
C. Brown, Update and Analysis of Test Score Trends: 1959-1984 .
FR-PRD -85-13 (Alexandria, VA : Human Resources Research
Organization, December 1985).
James R. Flynn, "Massive IQ Gains in 14 Nations: What IQ
Tests Really Measure," Psychological Bulletin 101 (1987): 171-
191.
2 From Louis Harris, Ins id e Amer ica (New York: Vintage
Books, 1987), pp. 60-61.
o Based on current levels of HIV infection (estimated at
1.5 million persons nationwide), the U.S. Centers for
Disease Control expects 324,000 diagnosed cases of AIDS by
the ejid of 1991--compared with about 35,000 in May of
1987. 21 Other health experts forecast 400,000 diagnosed
cases or more in the United States over the next 4 or 5
years. In 1987, about 1 out of 30 young-to middle-aged
men were reported to be infected with the virus. By 1991,
the disease is expected to rank behind accidents as the
second-highest cause of "premature death" among men. As
of 1987, it was estimated that between 5 and 10 million
persons world-wide were carrying the AIDS virus.
Implications for National Security; The Future May
No Longer Be What It Used To Be
Trager and Simonie provide a useful working definition of
national security:
National security is that part of government policy
having as its objective the creation of national and
international political conditions favorable to the
protection or extension of vital national values
against existing and potential adversaries.
The traditional instruments of national security policy are
diplomacy, alliances, and military power—but also include
economic assistance, technological research and development,
propaganda and communications, psychological operations, as well
2 6
as other means. The military has held a special position
21Marilyn Chase, "AIDS Costs: In Lives and Dollars, The
Epidemic's Toll is Growing Inexorably," Wall Street Journal . 18
May 1987, p. 1.
22
"The Staggering Price of AIDS," U.S. News and World Report .
18 May 1987, p. 1.
23Marilyn Chase, "Ballooning AIDS Epidemic Poses Threat to
Third World Stability, Official Says," Wall Street Journal . 3
June 1987, p. 34. Premature death is an actuarial figure based
on life expectancy and measured in terms of years of productive
life lost.
24 Ibid.
2 SFrank N. Trager and Frank L. Simonie, "An Introduction to
the Study of National Security," in National Security and American
Soc iety . eds. Frank N. Trager and Philip S. Kronenberg (Lawrence,
KA: The University Press of Kansas, 1973), p. 36.
26 Ibid., p. 46.
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throughout history as a tool for obtaining security objectives.
In fact, "national security" is often perceived in practice as a
shortened reference to "national military security," involving
"the generation of national military power and its employment in
27interstate relationships."
The ability to generate national military power is
influenced by a range of factors from the more practical/ such as
budgetary resources, to various normative elements. The present
discussion concentrates on a narrow but critical area affecting
the nation's military strength—namely, the military institution
itself and the fulfillment of basic needs in its conventional
forces. This approach is fragmentary at best, but should provide
some perspective regarding the possible effects of demographic
trends on the larger whole of national security.
The expected effects of demographic trends on the nation's
military can be divided into four separate, but interconnected
categories: (1) Qualified Manpower; (2) Defense Spending; (3)
Military Effectiveness; and (4) International Standing.
1. Qualified Manpower : Baby Busters in Arms
During fiscal 1986, the Armed Forces admitted 308,571 new
recruits. Over half of these new recruits were teenaged boys.
Traditionally, the military's primary pool of manpower is young
men in their late teens or a little older. Currently, slightly
less than 9 out of 10 recruits are men, three-quarters of whom
are no older than 20.
Because the military is so dependent on recruiting young
people, particularly men—without the aid of a draf t--defense
officials have been greatly concerned for many years about the
potential consequences of the "baby bust." As Fallows noted in
his 1980 commentary on National Defense , "one of the central
worries of military manpower planners is that they'll have
2 7 Klaus Knorr, "National Security Studies: Scope and
Structure of the Field" in National Security and American
Soc iety . eds. Trager and Kronenberg, p. 6.
11
trouble recruiting enough soldiers in the middle and late
5 o
eighties, when the cohorts of young people dwindle in size."
Indeed, no thoughtful treatment of military manpower issues
published or presented over the last dozen years could avoid the
topic. And few did. References to the impending disaster are
innumerable, appearing in a wide assortment of material, from
classified government briefings to pop commentary in the
newsstand press. In the late 1970s, when al 1- volunteer
recruiting waned, the "baby bust" issue surfaced with remarkable
consistency in arguments for a return to the draft. The
proponents of conscription had just cause for concern:
recruiting results in 1979 and 1980 were among the worst ever
since the draft had ended; and these were supposed to be the easy
years, the years when the number of military-age "baby boomers"
hit an all-time peak. If the all-volunteer effort suffered when
the supply of available manpower was at its very largest, many
asked, what would happen when the supply was at its very
smallest? 29
The astonishing answer is that all-volunteer recruiting
improved, and it kept improving with each passing year as the
eligible population declined. A 1982 Department of Defense
report observed with pride:
In FY 1981, the proportion of high school diploma
graduates increased in all Services, and particularly
2 8
*
James Fallows, National Deferse (New York: Random House,
1981)
, p. 138.
2 9 It is interesting to note that "the postwar baby boom,
which produced a significant increase in the number of eighteen-
year-olds between 1964 and 1979, had been a key consideration in
early calculations about the feasibility of a draft-free armed
force." See James L. Lacy, "Whither the All-Volunteer Force?,"
Yale Law and Policy Review V (Fall/Winter 1986): 50. Active
duty personnel strength in 1979 and 1980 was at the lowest level
since 1950.
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in the Army. The DoD total of 81 percent represents an
all-time high in the educational level of recruits.
Five years later, the proportion of new recruits with a high
school diploma exceeded 91 percent, even though the military's
target population had shriveled by more than 15 percent.
In fact, the "baby bust" scare turned out to be the Comet
Kahoutek of military manpower research: it was preceded by heavy
fanfare, arrived with great anticipation, and has since traveled
almost halfway through its course without so much as a fizzle.
Nonetheless, the population decline still has a way to go before
it bottoms out in the mid-1990s, and the supply of available
manpower may never again reach the booming levels of the past."
There is every reason to believe, as the manpower nosedive
accelerates, that a final chapter in the all-volunteer saga is
yet to be written.
Some analysts are quick to point out that the military-age
population was much smaller in the 1950s than it will be at its
lowest point in the years ahead. Furthermore, the post-Korean
military was bigger than it is today--with over 1 million more
enlisted personnel— requiring the services of one in every two
draft-age men (at a time when women were virtually excluded).
The proportion of young Americans needed to fill the ranks during
3 Department of Defense, Profile of American Youth: 1980
Nationw ide Administration of the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude
Battery (Washington, DC: Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense [Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics], March 1982),
p. 21.
From Defense Manpower Data Center tabulations. See also
P. J. Budahn, "Quality of Recruits Continues at Near-Record
Rates," Navy Times . 15 June 1987, p. 2. During the first half of
fiscal 1987, approximately 95 percent of all new recruits scored
average or above on the Department of Defense enlistment test.
Based on estimates in Bureau of the Census, Projections of
Population and other sources.
33 Richard Danzig and Peter Szanton, National Service: What
Would It Mean ? (Lexington, MA; Lexington Books, 1986), p. 78;
and Department of Defense, Selected Manpower Statistics
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1986).
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the worst of the dearth, other researchers note, would be far
below the levels of many previous years; and the available
population would also retain a reasonable "surge capacity," if
rapid mobilization were necessary.
The future of the all-volunteer military, Danzig and Szanton
write, "will hinge on whether or not the volunteer system can
meet future manpower requirements with recruits of reasonable
quality." The key words here are "reasonable quality," and the
military's demand for highly qualified people places an added
strain on draftless recruiting. The real question facing the
all-volunteer effort is not whether the required quantity of
manpower can be recruited—but whether the required quantity with
the required qualities can be enticed to join. This could be a
major problem in the years ahead, Binkin observes, "as the
number--if not the technical ab il i t ies--of young Americans
declines and the requirements for abler— if not more—military
a c
recruits grows." Indeed,
given present trends in arms technology and
demographics, by the early 1990s the nation's armed
forces could be caught between a growing requirement
for skilled people to operate and maintain
sophisticated weaponry and a diminishing supply of
youthful recruits capable of absorbing complex
training . '
This understanding is emphasized by the fact that only 3 out
of every 4 young men nationwide could probably qualify, on the
basis of their aptitude and education, for basic enlistment in
the Army or the Navy. About 2 out of 3 men could qualify for the
Marine Corps and even fewer could meet the standards for
34Robert F. Lockman and Aline 0. Quester, "The AVF : Outlook
for the Eighties and Nineties," Armed Forces and Society 11
(Winter 1985) : 171.
3 5Danzig and Szanton, National Service , p. 78.
36Martin Binkin, Military Technology and Defense Manpower
(Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1986), p. 80.
37 Ibid., p. 83.
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enlistment in the Air Force. The proportion of eligible youths
shrinks again when the failure rates for other entry criteria are
applied: over 16 percent of young men meeting minimum aptitude
requirements would be expected to fail the physical examination
and another 3 or 4 percent would probably be rejected on moral
3 8grounds. In addition, most jobs in the Armed Forces call for
aptitude test scores that exceed the minimum scores for basic
eligibility. Aptitude requirements in certain high-tech jobs
would currently disqualify as many as 70 percent of the male
population and almost 90 percent of all otherwise eligible
39women
.
One manpower analyst has attempted to gauge the military's
recruiting challenge by calculating the proportion of "qualified
and available" men that would have to volunteer for active or
reserve duty before age 23. Following one age group through
t ime--exclud ing the unqualified and the "nonavailable" college
population—Binkin estimates that about one-half of the remaining
men will have to enlist for the Armed Forces to meet their
planned recruiting objectives. In the early 1980s, the figure
was 42 percent. By the early 1990s, the required proportion of
"qualified and available" men is expected to grow to 55 percent,
assuming there are no changes in the quality of personnel, the
sex distribution or size of the force, and current levels of
college attendance.
There are assorted approaches to calculating an individual's
"availability" for voluntary service. There are also some
analysts who say that everyone in the relevant population should
be considered recruitable, that virtually anyone can be attracted
to military life under the right circumstances. Methodology
aside, the "qualified and available" statistic underscores the
3 8Mark J. Eitelberg, Manpower for Military Occupations
(Washington, DC: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
[Force Management and Personnel], Forthcoming).
39 Ibid., Technical Appendix.
40Binkin, Milit a ry Technol ogy, p. 81.
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point that young people have varying levels of propensity to
enlist; they have competing opportunities; and their plans for
education or work may not involve wearing a uniform. Moreover,
as the population continues to shrink, competition to fill
vacancies will undoubtedly intensify between the military,
colleges, and civilian employers—with each striving in new and
imaginative ways to tap the traditional pool of persons
"available" to the others.
The Department of Defense attributes recent successes in
manning the force to "vigorous recruiting efforts, additional
recruiting resources provided by the Congress, increased military
pay and compensation, and higher youth unemployment." Many
observers also believe that recruiting was helped by a positive
change in public opinion toward the military, a "surge of
national pride," a "reawakening of patriotism," or a similar
shift in the mood of the country. Perhaps, even more important
than any of these reasons was the simple fact that over time the
Armed Forces became more experienced and more adept at operating
in an all-volunteer environment. Through several years of trial
and error, coming after three decades of compulsory service, the
nation's lawmakers, defense policymakers, and uniformed leaders
finally learned how to fill the military's ranks with able
volunteers and how to keep them there.
P. good illustration of the learning experience factor can be
found in the recent history of the GI Bill. During the early
days of the all- vo lun teer experiment, GI Bill educational
benefits were more or less taken for granted as just another
perquisite of military service. Even though survey data had
shown that these benefits were an important lure for new
volunteers, especially high school graduates with above-average
test scores, there was never any formal effort made to highlight
their existence. The GI Bill was generally viewed as a veteran's
benefit, as compensation to draftees for lost time and for
readjustment to civilian life. It also gave service members a
Department of Defense, Profile of American Youth , p. 21.
16
reason for leaving the military/ and was therefore described as a
disincentive for reenlisting.
When President Ford announced the end of the Vietnam Era in
1975 and called for a cutoff of GI Bill benefits for new-
volunteers, the Armed Forces just began to realize what they had
and what they were about to lose. But the die had been cast.
Beginning in January 1977, the GI Bill was replaced with the
comparatively meager Post-Vietnam Era Veterans 1 Educational
Assistance Program (VEAP) . By one estimate, the conversion from
the GI Bill to VEAP accounted for a drop of between 5 and 1C
percent in enlistments of male high school graduates over the
following two years. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this
estimate is fairly conservative.
Whatever the case, VEAP was ultimately modified and more
generous benefits were extended to selected individuals out of
necessity. VEAP itself has since been replaced by a "New GI
Bill," while the Army and Navy have supplementary programs
offering much larger entitlements. Today, there is recognition
in all circles that educational benefits can be a very important
attraction of military service; and, furthermore, these benefits
can be targeted to specific markets of highly qualified youths.
Anyone who watches television, reads popular magazines, or
listens to rock radio, should know how the Army feels about its
College Fund and how important it is to Army recruiting.
The military's chief rivals for young people, colleges and
civilian employers of entry-level workers, have been watching,
listening, and reading. Apparently, they have also been learning
from the military's recruiting failures and successes. As Time
reports, McDonald's now has a recruiting program called
"McMasters" to entice older workers; Wendy's hamburger chain is
42Martin Binkin, America's Volunteer Military: Progress and
Prospects (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, p. 12);
also see Pichard W. Hunter and Gary P. Nelson, "Eight Years with
the All-Volunteer Armed Forces: Assessments and Prospects," in
Military Service in the United States , ed . Brent Scowcroft (New
York: Prentice-Hall, 1982), p. 97.
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offering cash incentives, college scholarships/ and "career
ladders" to its teenage employees; and other firms, once shy to
advertise, are spending large sums of money to recruit baby bust
workers. 43 An especially interesting example is the Boston
Globe 's "Paper Route to College" program—where boys and girls 12
or older can receive up to $5,000 toward one year's tuition at
college (with "added incentives") in return for three years of
honorable service delivering newspapers. 44 The net effect of all
this, as a population analyst observes, is that "baby busters
will in general have more of a choice [in the job market] and
better prospects for advancement than the previous generation." 45
Colleges are likewise "out hustling for freshmen in
innovative ways." One university is granting new students a
tuition-free fifth year if they wish to explore fields outside of
their major. Others are "stepping up recruitment and
diversifying the population, catering to women, older people and
part-timers."^' At the same time, recruitment budgets at four-
year colleges have increased by an average of 63 percent over the
past seven years, with some colleges spending over $1,000 a week
on television advertisements alone. The more aggressive schools
are now involved in "extensive marketing efforts," boosting their
scholarship funds and expanding their marketing staffs to compete
A ftfor students . -°
As the competition for baby busters intensifies, the
military may have to step up its own recruiting efforts by
augmenting its recruiting force and spending more on advertising-
43
"Welcome, America, to the Baby Bust," Time . 23 February
1987, pp. 28-29.
4 From full-page advertisement in Boston Globe , appearing in
summer 1987 editions.
45
"Welcome, America," Time . p. 29.




-especially so, if it intends to stay with its priir.ary market of
young men and remain an all-volunteer institution. In addition,
the increased demand for young, inexperienced workers is likely
to drive up the level of their wages relative to the average
wage. Lockman and Quester estimate that the peak increase in
real wages for men between the ages of 17 and 21 will occur in
1995, when these wages will be 10 to 12 percent above 1982
levels. This would be an expected reversal of the "baby boom
effect" in 1967-75, when the real wages of young men fell by
around 8 percent.
The projected increase in wages means that the military will
have to press even harder to keep its pay levels comparable to
the going rate in the civilian job market. Many manpower
analysts see pay comparability as the key factor controlling the
future of the All-Volunteer Force. "Advocates of the volunteer
system," write Danzig and Szanton, "assert that as long as
military pay is sustained at or near its present relation to
civilian wages, the personnel now projected to be required for
active duty likely can be drawn from volunteers." However, as
Lacy points out, active duty pay raises have not ranked high on
the list of priorities held by either Congress or the
administration for some time now; and this conscious neglect is
not likely to be reversed before recruiting or retention begins
to tumble:
Despite the dramatic catch-up raises in 1981 and 1982,
the comparability of military pay to that of civilians
is slipping again. Because of a 3 percent pay cap in
fiscal year 1986 and 4 percent pay caps in each of the
preceding three years, military pay now lags private
sector pay levels by 8.3 percent, as measured by the
Employment Cost Index. . . . However, the post-Gramm-
Rudman Congress shows little inclination to boost
49Lockman and Quester, "The AVF , " p. 178; and Lacy, "Whither
the All-Volunteer Force?," p. 55
enJ Danzig and Szanton, National Service , p. 75.
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military compensation by any significant amount in the
near future. -*-
2. Defense Spending; How Much is Not Enough?
The President's Military Manpower Task Force concluded in
1982 that "the military compensation package must be kept at
competitive levels to attract and keep the kind of people the
[All-Volunteer Force] must have." This is particularly true, the
Task Force emphasized, "when civilian unemployment rates go down
and the competition for capable people intensifies."-^ But
pumped up pay or bonuses for enlistment and reenlistment , when
combined with other defense expenditures, could put a serious
squeeze on the federal budget; and, by the time these actions are
taken, the federal budget may be squeezed dry.
The rapid defense buildup of the recent past, averaging $46
billion a year, has apparently hit the proverbial wall.
Historically, increases in defense spending have come to some
extent at the expense of domestic social programs, and emphasis
on social programs usually means less for defense. It is the
traditional tradeoff between "guns and butter" when resources for
each are limited. There are already indications that the cycle
has started to shift again and that a combination of factors may
soon force the nation to turn a few of its swords or ships into
plowshares. 53 Spending for defense will be curtailed at the very
least, possibly cut deeply over time, with the likely support of
the American people and a Congress bent on reducing the federal
51Lacy, "Whither the All-Volunteer Force?," p. 54. Also,
Robert F. Hale, "Congressional Perspectives on Defense Manpower
Issues," Armed Forces and Society 11 (Spring 1985): 343-345; 352.
52Military Manpower Task Force, A Report to the President on
the Status and Prospects of the All-Volunteer Force (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, November 1982), p. 1-3.
COJJThe changing commitment to domestic social concerns can be
tracked in thirty-year cycles beginning in 1901 with Theodore
Roosevelt's ascendancy to P res ident-- followed by Franklin
Roosevelt's New Deal program in 1932 and the Kennedy-Johnson era
in the 1960s. This suggests that the next cycle will take form
by the early 1990s.
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deficit. The pressures to trim defense will also escalate over
the next several years, driven largely by the demand for
increased spending in social areas.
A good deal of the pressure will emanate from the needs of
America's aging society. In fact, the nation's elderly currently
receive a large percentage of the federal budget: 28 percent in
1985, almost double the share 25 years earlier. These
expenditures also represent nearly half of all domestic program
spending, or an estimated $263 billion annually. Most of the
money goes to Social Security, and about 23 percent of the total
is spent on Medicare.
Federal expenditures for the elderly are expected to grow
considerably over the next few decades, as the population of
elderly Americans becomes both larger and older. Health care
costs are expected to account for most of the growth for several
reasons, including the fact that family and friends will be less
likely to provide home care (due to the "birth dearth") and
because fewer daughters will choose to stay at home rather than
work. The generation of baby boomers—able to extend their life
expectancy through advances in medicine and increased attention
to diet and exerc ise--will be a healthy population of senior
citizens but one that will still rely heavily on the medical care
industry.
The longer-term problems of the elderly are signalled by
present difficulties meeting the needs of this group and by the
often-heard warnings about the collapse of Social Security. A
recent report by the General Accounting Office points to at least
one major program requiring help: the Hospital Insurance Trust
Fund of Medicare, the federal health insurance program for the
elderly and disabled, is expected to run out of money by the late
1990s. 55
5 General Accounting Office, An Aging Society: Meeting the
Needs of the Elderly While Responding to Rising Federal Costs.
GAO-HRD-86-135 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
September 1986), pp. 2, 14.
55 Ibid., p. 2.
Of all the uncertainties in this nation's future, there is
probably nothing, barring nuclear war, more disturbing than the
potential impact of AIDS. In 1986, more than 3 out of 4
Americans believed that AIDS would become a serious epidemic. °
Officials in the Defense Department were also reported to be
worried about a "possible catastrophe for the military":
The Pentagon's nightmare runs like this: AIDS continues
to spread unchecked and infection among young American
males reaches the 10 to 15 percent level syphilis
attained early in World War II. Then a military crisis
occurs requiring major mobilization. With the nation's
manpower pool already shrinking for demographic
reasons, the armed forces might be forced to take men
regardless of health, as happened late in World War II,
when 10,000 men a month with syphilis were being
drafted. Penicillin and sulfa drugs proved effective
against syphilis and gonorrhea then, but there is no
cure for AIDS. '
Most people would agree that this scenario is a little far-
fetched, given current information on AIDS. In fact, the
military's own testing of applicants for enlistment in 1985-86
revealed an AIDS virus infection rate of 1.63 for every 1,000
persons (including a rate of 0.61 for every 1,000 women). The
highest infection rate for any one area of the country was found
in New York City, where 20.3 men out of every 1,000 applying to
the military tested positive for the AIDS virus. The rate for
women in New York City was just a little below that of men at
17.4 per 1,000 applicants. Researchers also found sizable
differences by race, with 3.89 of every 1,000 black applicants
56Casale, Tracking Tomorrow's Trends , p. 42.
57Peter Slavin, "The AIDS Threat," Army Times . 30 March
1987, pp. 49, 60.
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nationwide testing positive, compared with 0.88 of every 1,000
whites. 58
These data may not paint an accurate picture of infection
rates across the country, since military applicants do not
represent a cross section of the general population or even of
their own age group. Nevertheless, they do provide the first
results of large-scale testing and a marker for measuring the
future course of the disease. Testing of active duty members
shows a rate of infection similar to that of recruits, at 1.6 of
every 1,000 persons.
The most immediate impact of AIDS on the military will not
come from the resulting depletion of manpower but from the rising
costs of the disease to the nation as a whole. A recent study,
endorsed by the Office of Technology Assessment, predicts that
medical costs alone will grow eightfold, totaling $8.5 billion by
1991. Research, education, and bloodscreening costs are expected
to quadruple to $2.3 billion. In addition, health economists
forecast that indirect costs, coming from the lost wages and
productivity of working-age people, could run as high as $55.6
billion. These costs add up to $66.4 billion--a staggering
increase over the total economic cost of $5 billion in 1985 and
$10 billion in 1987. 60
-^Approximately 300,000 persons were tested between October
1985 and March 1986 at 71 recruiting stations nationwide.
Reported in "Test of Recruits Details Heterosexual AIDS Trend,"
Washington Post . 16 July 1987, p. 5; and Vesta Kimble, "AIDS
Report Widens Army-DoD Policy Rift," Army Times . 27 July 1987, p.
24. In San Francisco, the rate for men was 11 cut of every
1,000, and the rate for women was 10.9 out of every 1,000. In
Washington, D.C., the rates for men and women per every 1,000
persons of the same sex were 10.7 and 7.3, respectively.
59
"Army Reports Results of AIDS Virus Study," Monterey
Peninsula Herald (Associated Press), 16 July 1987, p. 1. It
should be noted that each person in the military is expected to
be a "mobile blood bank," if needed.
60Paul Blustein, "Public Spending on the Epidemic Will
Exceed $1 Billion This Year," Wall Street Journal . 18 May 1987,
p. 20; and "The Staggering Price of AIDS," U.S. News & World
Report . 15 June 1987, pp. 16-18.
23
Some health economists think these estimates are far too
conservative. A Pand study, for example, projects that AIDS
treatment costs will total more than $37 billion cumulatively
over the 1986-91 period, possibly reaching as high as $112
billion. During the same period, Medicaid's share of the costs
could run from $10 billion to $47 billion; employers could wind
up paying $14 billion in health care benefits; and payouts by
companies on life insurance policies could be similarly steep.
Already, there is evidence that Congress is responding to
AIDS by creating new programs in research, education and
prevention, and health care through Medicaid and Medicare that
will add billions of dollars to the government's annual outlay.
The "ballooning AIDS epidemic" throughout the world may also
affect the U.S. economy in other ways by creating a compelling
need to provide increased assistance to struggling nations. The
World Health Organization, for example, expects "a surge in cases
of acquired immune deficiency syndrome that could destabilize the
political and economic systems of the Third World."
Ultimately, the costs of AIDS and costs of caring for the
elderly will compete with the rising costs of defense. Other
domestic social programs will likewise be looking for scarce
federal dollars, and each will have its own powerful constituency
of supporters. The needs of these programs will also be
influenced by the changing demography of the country: in
particular, by increasing immigration, by increasing proportions
of minorities, by increasing numbers of school-age children, by
the redistribution of urban-area residents, by the increasing
61
"The Staggering Price," U.S. News & World Report , pp. 16-17.
62Blustein, "Public Spending," p. 20.
63Chase, "Ballooning AIDS Epidemic," p. 34. NIH officials
have estimated that 5 to 10 million people may be carrying the
AIDS virus worldwide— and that between 1 and 2 million could die
in the "global pandemic" over the next 10 years. See Marilyn
Chase, "Politics Overshadows Scientific Concerns at Major
Washington AIDS Conference," Wall Street Journal . 2 June 1987, p.
5.
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employment of women with young children, by the "birth dearth, "
and by numerous other population trends. The net effect of these
trends will be a Congress and an American electorate less willing
to support any sort of defense buildup without a clear
demonstration of necessity.
In 1980, a Harris survey found 71 percent of the American
people favoring an increase in defense spending. By 1983, Harris
found just 14 percent of the population in favor of increased
defense spending, a level of support confirmed again by a Gallup
survey in 1986. (This approximated the small percentage of
American people favoring an increase in defense spending at the
close of the Vietnam War.) In addition, when people were askec
in a recent survey to decide where they thought budget cuts
should be made, a vast majority pointed to defense: on a
structured list, defense cuts were preferred over cuts in farm
price supports, aid to college students, social security, health
and nutrition programs, Medicare, Medicaid, veterans' benefits,
toxic waste cleanup, aid to education, civilian retirement
benefits, and aid to cities. In fact, on this particular
question, defense was the runner-up favorite for budget-gashing,
second only to pay increases for federal workers— and just by a
narrow margin at that. 3 Harris writes:
Clearly, the bloom was off defense spending as far as
the American people were concerned. Congress finally
got the word in 1986, and it finally became unlikely
that defense spending would any time soon again enjoy
64 Harris, Inside America, p. 343
65 Ibid, pp. 345-346.
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its special position of the late 1970s and early
1980s. 66
Of course, attitudes toward defense spending could change
just as quickly as a ship is sunk or an embassy is seized or an
ally is roughed up. But the prevailing opinion/ barring national
crisis, will probably continue to downgrade the comparative needs
of defense in favor of social programs for the duration of the
current "guns vs. butter" cycle. Indeed, in 1987 the President
was said to be facing a "showdown with Congress over the federal
budget deficit" because of Congressional actions to raise taxes,
cut the military, and keep reductions in social programs to a
67
minimum.
Defense spending cuts, or even a freeze in spending, could
do a lot of damage quickly to military recruiting and create a
gradual braindrain in retention. The military's personnel area
is likely to be sacrificed, as Lacy observes, if it comes down to
"cutting, delaying, or stretching out major equipment programs
c o
that already have been approved or partly acquired." Simply
put, personnel items are the easiest to carve out of the defense
budget; and they present a large and helpless target to quickly
alleviate pressure for reductions. The possible effects of a
spending cut on recruiting should be clear from the discussion of
manpower issues above. The possible consequences for personnel
retention could be equally severe, and exiting careerists,
6 6 Ibid; p. 346. A survey conducted for USA Today had
similar results. "Reducing the federal deficit" ranked first
among the "most important problems for government to solve." At
the same time, "national defense" ranked 11th out of 13 possible
choices for "the most important places for the federal government
to spend our money." See Casale, Tracking Tomorrow's Trends , pp.
210-211. Oddly enough, several surveys also show that the
military itself is currently "the most trusted institution in
America." See Steve Warrick and P. J. Budahn, "Americans Trust
Military Most, Polls Show," Navy Times . 2 February 1987.
6 7 Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, "Reagan Faces Deficit Showdown With
Congress, Hard Choice of Paring Military or Raising Taxes," Wall
Street Journal . 16 July 1987, p. 56.
68Lacy, "Whither the All-Volunteer Force?," p. 55.
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trained and experienced in defense technology, are difficult to
replenish.
Personnel-related programs currently make up around 44
percent of the defense budget, and there is already a proposal to
trim active duty strength by 3.5 percent. Probably no Service
is more concerned about strength reductions (or merely a cutback
in planned growth) than the Navy. With dozens of new ships
entering the fleet over the next several years, Navy officials
worry that there may not be enough sailors to run them. £nd a
shortage of personnel for the Navy, they say, could set off the
"death spiral":
Experienced seamen must spend longer rotations at sea,
worsening the problems of family separations and low
morale. Inexperienced seamen are given technically
complex tasks aboard ships and costly equipment is
broken or poorly maintained.
The end result is that capable officers and enlistees become
overworked, frustrated, and unhappy. They shuck their uniforms
for a civilian job and the personnel problem worsens, steaming on
and on at accelerating speed.
Disenchantment with military life is an occupational ailment
not unique to sailors, and the separate Armed Forces may each
expect to face new obstacles in their endless attempt to retain
good people. The source of the retention problem is suggested by
the old saying: "The military enlists individuals but it
reenlists families." Although the Armed Forces have taken great
strides over the recent past to upgrade the quality of military
life for families, even more effort will be required in the
future.
69 John Burlage and Rick Maze, "Trost Warns Kill About New
Personnel Turmoil," Navy Times . 23 February 1987.
70 Tim Carrington, "Navy Frets That Its Growing Fleet May
Founder for Lack of Sailors in Climate of Budget Cutting," Wall
Street Journal , 18 March 1987. Some claim that the "death spiral"
has already been set in motion.
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This speculation comes from the understanding, as Segal
notes, that both the military and the family are "greedy"
institutions—both place great demands on individuals in terms of
71
commitments, loyalty, time, and energy. At the same time, the
military is highly unusual in the pattern of demands it requires
of its members and their families, including risk of injury or
death for the service member, geographic mobility, periodic
separations, residence in foreign countries, normative pressures,
72
and related obligations of service life. The interaction of
the military and the family has required that each adapt in some
respect to the other, each giving in and making certain
concessions. From the military side, this has meant recognition
of family issues in its personnel policies as well as the
provision of basic family support services. So far, reenlistment
statistics suggest that the union of the military and the family
is working—but population trends, coming in a climate of defense
cuts, could make the military family a little too "greedy" for
the happy union to endure.
When the last draft was abolished, significant changes took
place in the demographic character of the force. One conspicuous
change was an appreciable increase in the proportion of married
personnel: in 1967, 39 percent of enlisted personnel were
married, rising to 47 percent in 1970, 50 percent in 1972, 53
7 3percent in 1974, and 58 percent in 1978. A survey conducted in
1985 shewed that a total of 60 percent of enlisted personnel were
married, with higher proportions in the upper pay grades: 30
percent of enlistees in the lower pay grades were married,
compared with 60 percent in the middle grades, and 90 percent in
the higher pay grades. Approximately 70 percent of officers were
married in 1985. In addition, about 60 percent of the military's
7 1Mady Wechsler Segal, "The Military and the Family as
Greedy Institutions," Armed Forces and Society 13 (Fall 1986): 9.
72 Ibid., p. 15-23.
73 Ibid., p. 25.
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officers and 43 percent of enlisted personnel reported having
both a spouse and children in their household.
As a result, the military finds itself forced to reckon with
child care facilities, the problem of uprooting families (and the
toll it takes on school-age children and a working spouse), the
general environment for families, dependent housing and
education, family health care, and family services such as legal
advice, family counseling, financial assistance, family advocacy
(for family violence), relocation assistance, and so on. Family
patterns that are taking place in the general soc iety--such as
growing numbers of school-age children, the increasing presence
of dual-income families (and the phenomenon of dual-service
couples in the military), and the mounting number of single
parents— are reflected in the military. The "growing family rcle
of men" is also seen as the source of great problems by personnel
officials, who have been watching steadily climbing numbers of
qualified men leave the military because of family separation and
7 5frequent moves.
These family patterns and the continually increasing demands
placed on the military are certain to affect the personnel
portion of the military's budget because "married members and
7 6their families are heavy consumers of services and benefits";
and because "the quality of military spouse and family life is
important in itself and in its consequences for such key areas of
7 Mary Ellen McCalla et al., Description of Officers and
Enlisted Personnel in the U.S. Armed Forces: 1985 (Arlington, VA:
Defense Manpower Data Center, October 1986), pp. 54-58.
^James Gerstenzang, "Men's Growing Family Role Creating
Problems for Navy," Monterey Peninsula Herald ( L . A . Times
Service), 19 May 1986, p. 2.
76 Ibid., p. 54.
29
7 7
military concern as the retention of military personnel."
Consider, as well, the following cost comparisons: the
Department of Defense estimates that the pay and allowances
necessary to sustain a married Army sergeant come to $20,300 a
year, about $5,000 more than an unmarried sergeant; and, when the
married sergeant is transferred, the government will have to
spend an average of $3,200 to move him or her along with spouse
and family—compared with $750 in average moving expenses for the
7 8
single sergeant.
The resource issue has looked fairly bleak for quite awhile;
in fact, the outlook is so gloomy that it has prompted renewed
discussion of a return to conscription— for the primary purpose
of reducing military personnel costs. The puzzling aspect of
these proposals is that, along with social costs and economic
spillover effects, "most military manpower planners predict that
personnel costs actually would increase if the U.S. returned to a
80draft." Others in Congress and elsewhere have suggested that a
military draft be made part of a larger program of compulsory
national service, the full costs of which have never actually
been determined. x
7 7 .Janet D. Griffith, Zahava D. Doermg, and Bette S.
Mahoney, Descr ipt ion o^ Spouses of Officers and Enlisted
Personnel in the U.S. Armed Forces: 1985 (Arlington, VA: Defense
Manpower Data Center, November 1986), p. 153. In this light,
about one-third of enlisted men's wives said that their husband's
military job interfered with their employment. The figure was
higher for the wives of officers. (See ibid., pp. 102-105, 119.)
7 8Richard Halloran, "Women, Blacks, Spouses Transforming the
Military," New York Times . 25 August 1986.
7 9During the past year, there have been numerous calls for a
return to conscription or some form of national service. Many
arguments to bring back the draft are based on the premise that
compulsory service can reverse the spiraling cost of defense.
See, for example. Rick Maze, "Draft Will be Weighed in Cost-
Cutting Debate," Army Times . 10 February 1986, p. 4.
8 Ibid. In addition, see Sy
1
log is t ic s , Inc., The
Differential Budget C osts of Conscription-Based Alternatives to




"Enlisting with Uncle Sam," Time . 23 February 1987.
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3. Possible Issues of Military Effectiveness
The most important issue of military effectiveness will stem
from the problem of defense spending, as suggested above. Other
issues directly related to demographic factors include the
possible consequences of changes in the composition of military
members and the readiness of manpower for rapid mobilization.
Several changes in the composition of the active duty force
are expected to occur as the military attempts to meet the
challenge of its declining manpower pool and continues to reflect
the demographic trends taking place across the country. One
particularly noteworthy change has been the "graying of the
military," as Binkin writes:
Hence the military force fielded by the United States
in the mid-1980s is the most senior in the postwar
period, and if recent retention rates persist, the
force will continue to age in the future, with the most
conspicuous growth occurring in the proportion of
people with ten or more years of service. By fiscal
1990, it is estimated, about a third of the enlisted
force will fall into that category, up from about a
fourth in fiscal 1984. 82
The troublesome element of this trend is that it was not
well-managed. The force has not become more experienced in
critical areas. It is not necessarily wiser, just older: ". . .
too many individuals have been retained in unskilled or
semiskilled occupations for which experience may not be worth the
cost, thus expending resources that could be used as incentives
to retain more personnel in highly skilled jobs for which
experience is more relevant." In short, more senior people
require higher salaries and allowances and they are more likely
82Binkin, Military Technology , p. 128
83 Ibid.
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ft 4to be married and have families to support. These costs can be
offset by increased productivity and experience in highly
technical areas, but, overall, the evidence suggests they are
not. 85
The composition of the force is further expected to change
with respect to its total proportion of racial or ethnic
minorities. Specifically, as blacks, Hispanics, and Asians
continue to form a larger part of the manpower pool, researchers
predict that their levels of representation in the military will
similarly grow. This expectation also derives from the
understanding that minorities may be available to the military in
relatively greater supply, since their opportunities in higher
education and in the civilian job market tend to trail those of
whites
.
A marked increase in the participation of minorities could
affect the military in many ways. The disproportionate
representation of certain groups in the American military also
raises questions of equity and legitimacy that are firmly rooted
in the nation's guiding principles. A complete discussion of
these issues is beyond the scope of this paper.
8 4 The Congressional Budget Office projects that "seniority
growth" in the enlisted force will raise real personnel costs by
as much as $2.8 billion between 1988 and 1992. It is further
estimated that the aging factor could add an average of between
$450 million and $880 million per year to personnel costs in 1991
through 1994. See Congressional Budget Office, Sett ing
Personn el Strength Levels: Experience and Pr oductivity in the
Military (Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office, September
1987) .
OJ A recent study by the Congressional Budget Office
(reported in ibid.) attempted to measure the effects of seniority
growth on productivity. The analysts found that the necessary
data were limited and the results were therefore cons id e red inconclusive.
See Martin Binkin and Mark J. Eitelberg; with Alvin J.
Schexnider and Marvin M. Smith, Blacks and the Military
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1982.)
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One area of concern involves the fact that minorities may
wind up dying in disproportionate numbers during the initial
stages of a conflict. For example, if the United States were to
become involved in a low- in tens ity conflict this year, it is
likely that the 20 percent casualty rate of blacks that provoked
charges of racial genocide in the early stages of the Vietnam War
would appear small. If black casualties were simply proportional
to the number of blacks in the Army's enlisted ranks, one out of
every three Army combat deaths would be that of a black soldier.
This particular estimate should be considered the lower bound,
since black casualties in the opening days of a military
engagement will more likely reflect the proportions of blacks in
specific units assigned to combat--which , in most cases, are
higher than their overall rate of representation. (In 1983,
blacks accounted for more than half the strength of some combat
battalions .
)
There is another aspect of minority participation in the
military that seems to capture the imagination of defense
observers from one generation to the next throughout history. It
is the notion that certain groups of people in the American
melting pot hold ethnic or racial group loyalties that may
prevail over their sense of being an American or their
willingness to support the country. Indeed, the absorption of
immigrants into mainstream culture has been achieved historically
through the "blood test"
—
you proved you loved America through
allegiance and sacrifice and by paying the "pr ice-in-blood " in
battle. And so, the "fighting Irish" died in droves during the
American Civil War; Polish-Americans accounted for over 12
percent of the nation's casualties in World War I, though they
constituted just 4 percent of the U.S. population; and Japanese-
Americans, assigned mostly to the legendary 442nd Regimental
Combat Team, "fought with a vengeance" in the Second World War,
87
earning more than 18,000 individual decorations for valor.
87Michael Novak, The Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnic (New
York: Macmillan, 1972), pp. xxi-xxii; Victor Hicken, The American
Fighting Man (New York: Macmillan, 1969), p. 365; and Binkin and
Eitelberg, Blacks and the Military , pp. 25-38.
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Doubts about loyalty and patriotism have been pinned on
blacks throughout the history of this country, and some of these
views are still held today. The race riots of the 1960s and the
emergence of black militancy have helped to preserve and
strengthen this public perception in modern times. As the war
raged in Vietnam, some black leaders at home spoke of the racist
policies of the Selective Service System and the genocidal master
plan pitting black soldiers against the people of another colored
race. At the same time, as Newark, Detroit, Watts, and the
nation's capital witnessed violent unrest, black militants cried
"burn, baby, burn" and rumors quickly spread throughout the inner
cities that "brothers" were shipping disassembled M-60 machine
guns from Saigon in boxes marked "stereo equipment."
Wartime adversaries were said to have preyed upon the
supposed embitterment and smoldering hostility of black troops by
reminding them of their troubles at home and promising them a
better life. As recently as 1985, the tactic was tried by Libyan
leader Moammar Khadafy, who urged black U.S. servicemen to leave
the military and establish their own, separate army. "This
country [the United States] must be destroyed," Khadafy said in a
speech to a Nation of Islam conference. "They [whites] refuse to
accept you as American citizens. This means you are obliged to
create a separate and independent state. The whites force you to
op
do this by refusing you in political and social life."
This particular line of thinking— that blacks are somewhat
less patriotic than whites and that a wedge of racial
divisiveness can be driven through the nation's fighting force
—
is understandably offensive to members of the white, as well as
black community. More to the point, suspicions are raised that
black troops might be unwilling to carry out their assignments in
certain domestic situations, such as a ghetto riot or other civil
disturbance. These suspicions were, in fact, supported by an
op
"Khadafy Urges Black Servicemen to Form Separate Army in
U.S.," Monterey Peninsula Herald (Associated Press), 26 February
1985, p. 3.
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actual incident involving the "Fort Hood 43," a group of black
soldiers of the Army's 1st Armored Division at Fort Kood , Texas,
who refused to deploy for riot duty at the Democratic National
Convention in Chicago in 1968. ^
Similar fears of divided group loyalties kept the Eritish
government from sending Irish regiments into Northern Ireland
during the 1970s. It has also influenced Soviet manning policy--
seen in the key principle of "extraterritoriality"—where Soviet
soldiers are not allowed to serve in their native regions but are
stationed in geographically and ethnically different outposts.'
When the U.S. took military action in the Dominican Republic
in 1965, rebel forces tried to persuade black American soldiers
to "turn your guns on your white oppressors and join your
Dominican brothers." They did not. But no matter: what has
been in the methods of U.S. adversaries has also been in the
thoughts and concerns of some white Americans. A chairman of the
board of the NAACP has characterized the loyalty issue as a
92
"smokescreen thrown up by more subtle, sophisticated racists."
Racist or not, the running current of mistrust has survived two
centuries of wartime tests and life in America's melting pot,
and it lives on today.
With an increase in Hispanic participation expected over the
next two decades and the threat of American involvement in
Central America, the focus of attention for questions of loyalty
The group included 26 Vietnam veterans. An Army official
was quoted as saying, "The problem is so fearful that we won't
even discuss these people as Negroes." Feported in Time , 13
September 1968.
90 S. Enders Wimbush and Alex Alexiev, The Ethnic Factor in
the Soviet Armed Forces , R-2787/1 (Santa Monica, CA : Rand, March
1982), p. 12; and "The Red Army," World No. ^04, Public
Broadcasting Station (PBS) WGBF, 6 May 1981.
91Charles C. Moskos, Jr., The American Enlisted Man (New
York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1970), p. 130.
92
"All-Vol Critics Accused of Racism," Army Times , 1 August
1980.
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has recently shifted to Hispanic subgroups. The fears of some
are fueled by the fact that, on the average, Kispanics have thus
far "shunned" the all-volunteer military;^ they represent the
largest and most recent group of immigrants and generally
maintain close cultural, linguistic, and generational ties to
their homeland; and "as descendants of a conquered people,
[Hispanic immigrants] have a better reason than most minorities
to look beyond U.S. national boundaries when seeking to confirm
Q A
an ethnic identity." Moreover, a sense of "hemispheric
solidarity" may ultimately drive persons of Spanish origin to
define their political role by actively espousing Mexican or
Latin American causes in the United States. 5
The last point was pressed home in 1986 when thirty
California National Guard troops were sent to Honduras to act as
interpreters for a Missouri Guard engineering unit that was
building a road near Nicaragua. Leaders of four Latino groups
protested the use of Spanish-speaking soldiers in Central
America, calling it an "outrage and an affront to us as a
people." A spokesman for the League of United Latin American
Citizens said his organization opposed military intervention in
Central America and predicted that "as this country becomes
Rick Maze, "Services Study Why Hispanics Shun the
Military," Navy Times . 30 April 1984. It also bears noting that
"Hispanic-Americans have defended our nation with pride and
courage," as described in Department of Defense, Hispanics in
America's Defense (Washington, DC: Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Equal Opportunity and Safety Policy
1983). Hispanic-Americans as a group have a remarkably high
share of Medal of Honor recipients— 37 in all. See, for example,
Paul Morin, Among the Valiant (Alhambra, CA: Borden Publishing
Company, 1966); and W. H. Harris, Puerto Rico's Fighting 65th
U.S. Infantry (San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1980).
9 4 Irene F. Rothenberg, "The Panama Canal Issues and the
Peagan Campaign: Reflections from 1976 and Projections for 1980,"
Journal of Ethnic Studies 7 (1980): 44.
Irene F. Rothenberg, "Mexican-American Views of U.S.
Relations with Latin America," Journal of Ethnic Studies 6 (1978):
73.
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involved in that part of the world, . . .there will be a lot of
resistance within our own community. . . ."'6
"In one way or another," states Griggs, "every minority in
the U.S. has had to face the contradiction of having to fight for
a country whose armed forces and whose society at large is marked
by racist practices." 97 Yet, aside from a few scattered
incidents, the fear of disloyalty or sedition has no basis of
fact in American history. If anything, it is the feeling of
mistrust and the drive to overcome it that has propelled members
96
"Latinos Protest Use of National Guard," Monterey
Peninsula Herald (Associated Press), 1 May 1986, p. 15. In 1984-
85, there were expressions of protest in Puerto Rico regarding
the use of Puerto Rican National Guard troops in training
exercises in Central America. A scholar recalls the "significant
role Kispanics played in the U.S. invasion of the Dominican
Republic in 1965" and the ensuing effects: "Many Chicano
participants of this tragic affair were to suffer pangs of
consciousness and shame. . . . Some of my own personal
acquaintances never recovered from the shock of recognizing,
Oedipus-like, that it was they who had shed the blood of their
own." See Professor J. Jorge Klor de Alva, "Hispanics in the
U.S. Armed Forces: Opportunism or False Consciousness?", State
University of New York at Albany, unpublished, n.d.
In May of 1987, an Air Force sergeant, assigned to an elite
reconnaissance flight team monitoring radio signals along the
Nicaraguan border, became the first U.S. servicemember to refuse
military duty in Central America. The sergeant, a Mexican-
American, said "I felt like I was making war on my own people,"
when he filed for a discharge as a conscientious objector. See
Kenneth W. Grundy, "Soldier Refuses to Make War on His Own
People," Atlanta Constitution . 4 August 1987, p. 15.
Anthony Griggs, "Minorities in the Armed Forces," Race
Relations Reporter 7 (July 1973): 13.
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of suspected groups to prove their patriotism through exemplary
Qfi
service . °
The other side of the Hispanic issue, the positive side, is
presented by the Army's Hispanic Policy Study Group in a 1986
report. The Study Group suggests that the Army will need a
"bilingual/bicultural capability" to effectively pursue low
intensity conflict in Latin America. "Bilingual capability is a
force multiplier in low intensity conflicts," the Study Group
points out. Furthermore, the Army will require "leadership
capable of coordinating effectively with Latin Americans" and
Hispanic-Americans "constitute a subset of the leadership
required." For these reasons, "Hispanic-Americans constitute a
tremendous bilingual national resource that has yet to be
tapped"— and, since policy concerning their participation is an
important readiness issue, the Army should actively recruit
ii Spanish-dominant Hispanics" for enlistment. 99
Racial and ethnic group representation in the American
military is an emotionally charged topic and frequently captures
attention in the public media. In fact, it is a subject that
surfaces with almost automatic regularity in many critical
discussions of all-volunteer recruiting. Only recently, however,
have writers on defense manpower issues uncovered a truly
critical quest icn--namely , whether emerging technologies have
q o
Yet, researchers have recorded a disturbing rise in the
percentage of American people, particularly minorities, who feel
"alienated" from the rest of society. For example, Lou Harris
recently found that 70 percent of blacks feel "alienated,"
according to an index measure—compared with a level of 33
percent 20 years ago. See Harris, Inside America , p. 38. In
addition, analysts estimate that the economic gap between the
rich and the poor in America (based on the distribution of
wealth) may be wider now than in the past 40 years. Some
forecasters anticipate a growing rift between social or economic
classes in the United States and increasing expressions of
resentment by the general group of "have nots."
9 9 Guillermo H. Barbosa, Wayne Gosnell, and Consuela Evans,
The Latin Ame rican Challenge and Army Hispanic Soldier Policy
(Washington, D.C.: Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army
[Manpower and Reserve Affairs], 18 February 1986), pp. 2-3.
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pushed military hardware beyond the capabilities of people, all
types of people, that the Armed Forces can expect to attract and
retain. ° A reporter writes:
As the Defense Department approaches the $2 trillion
mark in its arms buildup, the services confront the
problem of manning the battlefield of the 21st century
with ordinary soldiers, sailors and airmen with the
high-technology hardware. . . . Although the problem
of matching troops to equipment has dogged the nation's
military for years, the challenge has taken on serious
new ramifications with the emphasis on sophisticated
weaponry and a dwindling supply of potential young
recruits . °
"For years," another journalist observes, "the arms industry-
has thrived by throwing more gadgets into weapons, impressing the
generals with high-tech razzle-dazzle." Mow, battlefield
planners have nightmares that their combat troops will go to war
armed to the teeth with ultra-sophisticated, microelectronically-
loaded "smart" weapons--that don't work or take a genius to
operate—only to be defeated by an enemy shooting arrows.
Battlefield planners also feel uneasy about the wartime
preparedness of the new, family-oriented volunteer force. It has
been suggested, for instance, that married service members,
stationed far from home in a remote war zone, may be adversely
affected by their concern for the safety and well-being of their
families. At the same time, with growing numbers of dual-
income families and dual-military career couples, any deployment
1
^Binkin, Military Technology , provides an excellent overview
of the problem and summary of the policy options.
^^-Molly Moore, "U.S. Troops Find Weapons Too Complex,"
Washington Post . 23 August 1986. This article closely parallels
Binkin, Military Technology.
102John H. Cushman, Jr., "Making Arms the Fighting Man Can
Use," New York Times . 21 June 1987.
103Gerstenzang , "Men's Growing Family Role"; and McCalla et
al., Description of Officers and Enlisted Personnel , p. 54.
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or mobilization will send service members scrambling to find
child care. Manpower officials are inevitably driven to ask:
"When the balloon goes up, who'll watch the kids?" In a 1985
survey, 15 percent of enlisted personnel and 6 percent of
officers said that they had no workable long-term care
arrangements for their dependents. For both officers and
enlisted personnel, the availability of dependent care was the
most important obstacle faced in responding to changes in working
hours, base recall, or a unit deployment. Indeed, in this
survey, only 54 percent of enlistees said that they definitely
had "workable day care arrangements" for their children during an
extended unit deployment; and just 68 percent claimed to have a




"A nation cannot be a great power unless it has a large
population," Wattenberg writes in The Birth Dearth. ° 5 He
explains
:
Larger populations produce a larger gross national
product. And brute economic production is one critical
aspect of national strength and security. Larger
populations can build more easily the infrastructure of
industry, transport, commun icat ions--all of which
support national defense. . . . Attaining
technological leadership requires collecting a large
critical mass of scientists. Only a large consumer
market can support much industrial scientific
innovation, which often spins off into the military
field. Only a large society can tax its people enough
to finance major research and development directly for
the military. And, of course, a large society makes it
easier to provide the nianpower for the Army, Navy,
Marines, and Air Force.
10 McCalla et al., Description of Officers and Enlisted
Personnel . pp. 132-139.
105Wattenberg, The Birth Dearth , p. 82.
106 Ibid., p. 83.
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Big nations are likely to have a strategic advantage in all
of these areas, adds Wattenberg. Modern military technology can
also compensate for some degree of demographic inferiority, but
"no amount of technical superiority could balance a gross lack of
population over a long period of time." 107 Furthermore,
population is seen to play an important role in the international
political realm, "where not only military power but wealth, are
TOPthe chips in the games that nations play."
Although the U.S. population is not expected to actually
decline for another 50 years or more (assuming all goes according
to schedule) , the "birth dearth" trend could still affect
national security over the near future in a variety of ways. fl
few possible c on sequenc es -- such as recruiting shortfalls,
economic turbulence, and the changing character of military
personnel— are treated above. Several ether reactions to the
"birth dearth" could also affect the nation's defensive
capabilities. But the most important consequence, as Wattenberg
and others see it, is the overall decline of the West: "In my
judgment, the major threat to Western values and the free world
concerns the fact that, as the next century progresses, there
won't be many free Westerners around to protect and promote those
values." 109
In the more immediate future, the U.S. can probably expect
to be "besieged with demands from the less developed nations
[which have rapid population growth] for readjustments in the
distribution of wealth"--a situation, according to an Army
report, that could create "a world of increasing civil unrest and
terrorism as the rising economic expectations of third world
107 Ibid., p. 82.
108 Ibid., p. 85.
109 Ibid., p. 167.
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nations are not met." Moreover, the "slow-motion, demographic
suicide" in Europe—with a worst-case fertility rate of below 1.3
in West Germany—may cause the Western European nations to seek
greater defensive support from the United States. Indeed,
defense analysts have questioned how long West Germany can
continue to supply 12 military divisions to NATO. Germany
itself has responded to the sharply declining pool of manpower by
lengthening the enlistment terms of its soldiers and by
participating in joint training exercises with France (an unusual
union, considering history).
Some defense thinkers see the European "birth dearth"
creating "an illusion that manpower will no longer be important."
A shortfall in troops, they say, could then result in a
deemphasis of conventional defense in favor of other means, such
112
as nuclear weapons.
There is evidence that the economic and technological
dominance of the United States has already begun to slip-
primarily at the hands of an ally, no less, that has fewer people
and an equally low rate of fertility. Consider the following : XJ- J
o The U.S., which has less than 5 percent of the world's
population, produced about 70 percent of the world's
scientific information about a decade ago. Today, it's
approximately 50 percent; and in ten years it's
expected to fall to 30 percent.
Department of Army, American Soldier , pp. 6-8.
Wattenberg ( Birth Dearth , p. 44) projects that the Third World
population will increase from its current level of 3.7 billion to
8 billion by the middle of the next century.
Alan L. Otten, "Some Thinkers Expect Population to Drop
and Trouble to Result," Wall Street Journal . 18 June 1987, pp. 1,
20.
112Edward Luttwack quoted in "The Birth Dearth Debate," U.S.
News & World Report . 22 June 1987, pp. 64-65; and Wattenberg, The
Birth Dearth , pp. 93-95.
113 This discussion draws heavily from William Van Dusen
Wishard, "The 21st Century Economy," The Futurist . May-June 1987,
pp. 23-2 8.
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o Some Japanese companies are now receiving more U.S.
patents than their U.S. competitors. For example:
Hitachi has been receiving almost 4 times as many U.S.
patents as Texas Instruments; Nissan more than General
Motors and more than Ford and Chrysler combined; and
Fuji Photo Films more than the venerable American
institution of Eastman Kodak.
o Japan is becoming the world's premier investor and
creditor, with "economic and financial clout [that]
could eventually rival the power held by Britain in the
nineteenth century and the United States after World
War II." 114 Japan already holds about half of the
United States' foreign debt, and Japanese banks have
provided over $200 billion through loans and bond
purchases; as well as $100 billion in loan guarantees
and letters of credit to American states, cities,
universities, and businesses.
Another trend in international trade is the increasing
number of joint ventures and other alliances between companies
from separate countries. Fapidly changing technology and
industry's need for financial flexibility are largely-
responsible. Wishard notes that, at one time, foreign dependency
for parts or products was unimaginable. Companies were totally
independent. The old Ford Motor Company even raised its own
sheep to provide the wool for upholstery in its cars. Today, at
least half of the parts in a new Ford car are manufactured
elsewhere. 115
Industry alliances and U.S. dependency on foreign goods have
important implications for U.S. security, most directly when
foreign-made products become critical components in expensive
military equipment and weapons. The potential problems of this
practice were dramatized recently when it was rumored that some
foreign-made silicon chips, purchased through Korean businesses
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Looking Ahead
Barring the outbreak of war or a serious national crisis, it
is likely that the All-Volunteer Force will remain all-voluntary.
However, keeping the ranks filled with highly qualified people
will not be easy, and certain changes will be necessary. The
following speculations regarding these changes are offered:
1. Pressures to severely limit or cut defense spending will
intensify. Something will have to be sacrificed, and, at
first, it will be personnel-related outlays. Eventually,
the adverse effects of these cuts will be seen in recruiting
and retention. Given the prospect of either returning to a
peacetime draft (with substantial reductions in military pay
and benefits) or raising the budget for defense, the
American people and their representatives will choose the
latter. This will result in a new tax hike, added to the
previous increases in taxes arising from efforts to reduce
the federal deficit.
2. Resources for defense will be the big issue of the
future: How much defense do we really need and how can we
pay for it? As we struggle to answer these questions, the
composition of the Armed Forces will be changing. The
"graying" of the military will continue, reflecting trends
in the general population. A greater effort will be made to
manage the force in this respect, as older, more experienced
people are used to fill vacancies in the supply of younger
manpower. Manpower planners will also seek to increase the
number of female personnel--lead ing first to expanded
opportunities for women in combat support jobs, and then to
a complete removal of the ban on assigning women to
combat. Steps will also be taken to enhance the
opportunities of racial/ethnic minor it ies--result ing in
refined techniques for screening applicants (including those
with limited English language skills), for placing new
recruits in military jobs, and for promoting careerists.
Hispanic-Americans will be targeted for enlistment, and
programs will be developed to take full advantage of their
bilingual abilities. Entry standards and retention policies
will be modified in experimental ways, as the military
attempts to remodel its traditional pool of "qualified and
available" persons.
Legislation that would allow women to serve in more
combat support jobs is currently being considered by Congress.
The Senate bill would open to women 140,000 jobs in the Army,
14,000 shipboard billets in the Navy, and about 4,000 Air Force
jobs. See Rick Maze, "Dickenson Wants Expanded Roles for Women,"
Navy Times . 20 July 1987, p. 41; and Sharon B. Young, "Bill
Proposes Expansion of Women's Role," Navy Times . 9 March 1987.
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3. Retention of highly skilled people will become a serious
problem, requiring innovative programs that improve the
quality of military life and satisfy the needs of military
families. More effort and money will be devoted to this
area. In addition, proposals to alter the pay structure of
the military will be considered, as the Services begin to
lose personnel with desired abilities and experience in
technical areas. The need to compete with private industry
may eventually result in a pay system that distinguishes
between people in different occupations, abandoning the
time-honored tenet that people with the same rank and
seniority make the same contribution to national security.
Other changes may also be required in the structure of the
force, particularly with respect to the reserve components, if
the size of the active duty military is reduced. Moreover, it is
likely that the shared problem of a "birth dearth" among the
Western allied nations will act to tighten existing bonds and
forge a stronger sense of shared responsibility for self-defense.
It has been observed that predictions of the world to come
usually dwell on the gloomy side of the picture. This paper is
no exception to the norm. Most of what is mentioned here will
cause problems, some of which will be painful, but all of which
can be overcome. The good news is that many problems lead to
changes that help to create a better world in which to live.
This is what we hope for. This is what we expect.
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- Appendix -
A Note on the Canadian Experience
The demographic trends in Canada are similar to those in the
United States. For example, like the United States, Canada is
experiencing a "birth dearth"; its population is aging; women are
joining the labor force in growing numbers; and, in this nation
of about 26 million people, immigration accounts for one-third of
total annual growth. 1 ' The immigration factor, though
comparable to the U.S., also has a unique Canadian character:
While French cultural representation is remaining
relatively stable, the percentage of those reporting
British ethnicity has shrunk. Immigration has changed
the composition of society so that the Canadian mosaic
now includes a significantly greater proportion of
visible minorities.
The Canadian population is expected to peak at just under 29
million around the year 2010 and then start to decline. The
median age of the Canadian population is expected to be above 40
in that year, higher than the median age of 38.5 in the United
1 1 9States. Canadian labor force growth rates are falling. -^
The Canadian Forces, which have about 86,000 members, are
also undergoing changes much like those occurring in the U.S.
military. The Canadian Forces are enrolling proportionately more
twenty-five year olds and fewer persons between 17 and 20 years.
At the same time, the overall education level of the military is
increasing— influenced by rising levels in the general population
and by advances in military technology that have brought about
higher education and aptitude standards for entry (especially in
12
mathematics and science).
117 From Current Demogr aphic Analys is : Report OH tJlS.
Demographic Situation in Canada. 1983 . Processed, n.d.
118DPDS, "Current and Future Trends That Could Influence CF
Personnel Policies and Personnel Management Structures," January
1986, Processed, p. 2.
119DPDS, "Task Project: Demographic Trends," No. 5, June
1986, Processed.
120 Ibid., para. 28 and 29.
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Some manpower analysts believe that social and demographic
trends may create "pressure from a number of sources to bring
[Canadian Forces'] policies and practices more in lire with the
social mood and aspirations of the country."^ 1 It is also
anticipated that changes in the traditional recruiting base— from
"uneducated, white 17-24 year old, physically-fit males" to a
wider pool including formerly under represented or excluded
groups--could have "far-reaching ramifications for both the
composition and culture of the [military]."
Indeed, a major shift in the composition of the Canadian
military is signalled by the recent decision to test the effects
of placing women in combat jobs. Already, Canada has eliminated
gender restrictions in all of its Air Force jobs, and plans are
underway to place women in combat-type jobs within the Army and
the Navy on a trial basis. The motivation for conducting the
test, which could last up to four years, is not directly related
TOO
to the problem of a shrinking manpower pool. "The fundamental
principle involved here," the Canadian Defence Minister has
stated, "is that every Canadian citizen has equal rights and




This is a very unusual move, as a top Canadian military
official points out, since most military systems are the
12 Sdinosaurs of society when it comes to social issues. The
results of these experimental combat programs, monitored by the
Combat-Pelated Employment of Women Trials Office, will certainly
be watched with great interest by Canada's neighbor to the south.
121DPDS, "Current and Future Trends," p. 5.
122 ibid.
* Sharon B. Young, "Combat Slots Studied for Canadian
Women," Navy Times . 2 5 May 1987.
12 Joseph Owen, "Canada to Test Women in Combat Jobs,"
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